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In a highly industrialized society, second and third party institu-
tions-banks, telephone companies, hospitals, doctors' offices, credit
bureaus'-collect and maintain an enormous quantity of personal
information.2 Data which were once either nonexistent or confined
solely to the individual's personal records are now reposited in files,
computer discs, and microfilm beyond the individual's physical con-
trol. Statutory and common law restrictions usually govern the dis-
closure of this information to private parties. Yet the only effective
contingency barring complete government access to these personal
files is the recalcitrance of the second or third party institution.3 This
1. The term "third party" is used to describe an institution which is acting only
as its customer's agent in executing transactions between the customer and another
individual; the institution therefore has little or no interest in the subject matter
of the underlying transaction. Examples include a telephone company in the trans-
mission of customer telephone conversations and a bank in paying a check drawn
on it by a depositor.
"Second party" describes an institution which is directly engaging in business with
its customer and which is itself a party to the substantive transaction. A hospital or
doctor rendering services to a patient, an attorney giving legal advice to a client, or
a bank making a loan transaction would be considered acting as "second parties."
2. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENcES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY (1972);
V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SocIETY (1964); J. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE
(1973); M. WARNER & M. STONE, THE DATA BANK SOCIETY (1970); Karst, "The Files",-
Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 342 (1966); notes 84-86 infra.
3. Both Senate and House reports on the Bank Secrecy Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, suggest that access to bank records is regulated. The
Senate Banking Committee's report stated,
Access by law enforcement officials to bank records required to be kept under
this title would, of course, be only pursuant to a subpoena or other lawful
process as is presently the case. The legislation in no way authorizes unlimited
fishing expeditions into a bank's records on the part of law enforcement officials.
S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 16 (1970). The Bank Secrecy Act and the Treasury regulations
thereunder have been generally thought not to have changed the government's ability
to gain access to bank records. See Letter of Sec'y of the Treasury George P. Shultz,
June 19, 1972, in Hearings on S.3814 & S.3828 Before the Subcomm. on Financial In-
stitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 292 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bank Disclosure Hearings]; 31 C.F.R. § 103.51
(1973) (amended regulation effective Jan. 17, 1973). But cf. Stark v. Connally, 347 F.
Supp. 1242, 1250-51 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part, revld in part sub nor. California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974).
Disclosure of telephone conversations to government agents is restricted by statutes
and the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). But records of long distance telephone calls
are apparently fair game for government investigators. Disclosure of toll call records
is not included within the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) (1970); and 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (1970) contains a broad exception which permits divulgence of information "on
demand of other lawful authority." Both United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536,
541-42 (2d Cir. 1969) and United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
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Note isolates the problem of government access to one type of third
party data: checking account records maintained by commercial
banks.4 It is argued that, given the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the changes which have taken place in the nature of prop-
erty and privacy, individuals should be able to contest an unreason-
able search and seizure of their bank records. This Note additionally
held, without even considering the "other lawful authority" language, that Congress
did not intend to prevent divulgence of toll call records to government investigators.
Also, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently rejected an informal
proposal that it issue an order or regulation which would construe the phrase "lawful
authority" to mean a subpoena, summons, or similar formal order and which would
provide for notice to the telephone company's customer in the event of a governmental
request for access. Letter from Kelley E. Griffith, Chief, FCC Domestic Rates Div.,
to William Olds, Executive Director, Conn. Civil Liberties Union, Aug. 17, 1973 (FCC
letter #9310). However, after a formal complaint on the matter was filed with the
FCC by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union against Southern New England Tele-
phone Company, the company announced that, "Effective March 1, no Bell System
telephone company will turn over customer long distance records to government or
law enforcement agencies or legislative committees except under subpoena or adminis-
trative summons." Southern New England Tel. Co. Press Release, Feb. 15, 1974, at 1.
See also Conn. Civil Liberties Union News, Feb. 1974, at 1, col. 3.
By negative implication § 1681f of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t
(1970), would seem to prohibit credit reporting bureaus from disclosing all but a
limited type of information to government agents. However, investigators might at-
tempt to avail themselves of the exceptions of §§ 1681b (3)(D) and (E) of the Act
through a broad interpretation of phrases which authorize disclosure in connection
with a "benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality" on "legitimate business
. .. [in the context of] a business transaction." The government could also advance
the argument that, despite its literal import, the Act was designed primarily to prevent
the misuse of information by private parties and was not intended to bar a dis-
closure to government agents involved in legitimate criminal and tax investigations;
cf. United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Government access to
credit agency files has been unlicensed in years past. See Bank Disclosure Hearings,
supra, at 1475; Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035,
1039-40 (1971).
Hospitals reportedly have strict rules controlling the release of medical data to gov-
ernment officials, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 148, but
security is often weak, id. at 204. With the cooperation of private insurance companies,
government agents may also be able to gain access to large medical data banks. See
Hearings on S.2360 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 442 (1973).
4. Commercial banks today engage in a myriad of customer services, each of which
generates records. This Note focuses only on checking accounts for several reasons.
First, checking accounts have a long history of customer secrecy. The litigation con-
cerning unauthorized disclosure of account information has been confined to release
of checking account information. See pp. 1463-64 infra. Second, cancelled checks and
deposit slips are the type of records most frequently sought by government investi-
gators, since they provide documentary proof of the depositor's activities with other
individuals. See the case histories described in Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3,
at 93-98. Third, in processing checks, banks function most clearly as passive inter-
mediaries, without any interest in the underlying fund transfers other than verification
that the instrument is valid and properly negotiated. This status as payments-transfer
intermediary distinguishes the commercial bank from other financial institutions. In
contrast, a bank engaging in a loan transaction is a creditor, as to whom such a strict
duty of secrecy may not apply. See United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234,
1235 (6th Cir. 1973) (financial data submitted to bank in loan application not subject
to constitutional protection). Unless otherwise noted the term "bank records" will be
used to refer only to bank documents pertaining to checking accounts.
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maintains that banks ordinarily lack authority to consent to a govern-
ment search of depositors' records.
I. The Conflict Between Depositor Privacy and Government Access
to Bank Records
Access to bank records facilitates government investigations-
whether the inquiry is legitimate or not.5 Bank data reveal more than
credit-worthiness, wealth, and income. Records which list dates, payees,
payors, and other memoranda can be used to reconstruct an accurate
profile of an individual's activities, habits, and even intimate personal
affairs." In years past some bankers have cooperated with federal
agents by informally providing information concerning their deposi-
tors' transactions. 7 These judicially unsupervised inspections of de-
positors' accounts have resulted in serious and possibly widespread
abuses, particularly in the form of government surveillance of po-
litically dissident individuals."
Several factors exacerbate the problem of government access. The
amount of information retained by financial institutions in their
ordinary course of business has greatly increased.9 If banks were not
already recording virtually every aspect of their depositors' transac-
tions, they were forced to do so by the Bank Secrecy Act' ° and Treas-
ury regulations'1 thereunder. Furthermore, the development of an
5. Government investigators have strongly emphasized their need for bank informa-
tion. See Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3, at 41-60, 106-22; Hearings on H.R.
15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
10-180 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Secrecy Act Hearings.]
6. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1526 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 1529 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra
note 3, at 176.
7. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1534-35 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Bank cooperation was present in the case histories described by the
Treasury Department in the Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3, at 93-98, 104.
See also Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 5, at 312-73.
8. A number of incidents were discussed in Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note
3, at 135-43, 164-75, 176-77. After producing evidence concerning FBI surveillance of the
checking accounts of Jane Fonda, Floyd McKissick, and Benjamin Spock, columnist
Jack Anderson stated, "[Tjhe F.B.I. has been nosing into private bank accounts for
years, with the full cooperation of bank executives." Id. at 137-38. See also Address
by John Shattuck before the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Jan. 25, 1973, at 4 n.l.
9. See note 103 infra.
10. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 [hereinafter cited as
Bank Secrecy Act]. The Bank Secrecy Act is codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1970) (re-
tention of records by insured banks); id. § 1730d (retention of records of savings and
loan institutions insured by the Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp.); id. §§ 1951-59
(retention of records by all noninsured financial institutions); and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122
(1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign currency transactions).
11. 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1973). See note 52 infra for a description of the record-
keeping requirements. These recordkeeping requirements were upheld against consti-
tutional attack in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974).
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electronic funds transfer system12 in lieu of current paper check pay-
ments will provide more information concerning depositors' transac-
tions13 and will place the data in a readily accessible and usable form.' 4
The ability to retrieve quickly information concerning individuals'
payments and receipts creates the specter of computerized searches of
thousands of accounts for specified funds transfers. In light of the
massive recordkeeping of personal financial transactions, unrestricted
government access to bank records poses a severe threat to civil lib-
erties and privacy.' 5
12. A description of the operations of electronic banking and a survey of the legal
problems it engenders can be found in LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES OF ELECRONIC
FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND NEW PAYMENT SERVICES, REiFsTAD RESEARCil REPORT No. 7,
Feb. 1973 (Payment Systems, Inc., N.Y.C.); Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15, 1973, at 116-24; Note,
Toward a Less Check Society, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1163 (1972). A bibliography can
be found in Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 353 (1968).
13. For example, some plans for electronic funds transfer system (EFTS) envision
that, when point-of-sale transfers of funds are made (see Bus. WEEK, supra note 12,
at 117), a different code would be used on the depositor's monthly statement to dif-
ferentiate the transaction from a preauthorized payment or payments made at the
bank. The whereabouts of the depositor could be reconstructed by examining his bank
statement and following the point-of-sale transactions made. Interview with Dale
Reistad, Pres. of Payment Systems, Inc., in New York City, Aug. 31, 1973.
14. Checks are usually microfilmed in batches received rather than by individual
account. Interview with Robert Glazer, Zone Sales Manager of Microimagery Div. of
Bell & Howell, in New York City, Feb. 21, 1974. While one check may be located
relatively quickly, many hours may be needed to retrieve all copies of an account's
cancelled checks in order to reconstruct a depositor's activities, particularly if the
bank has adopted an inefficient indexing or storage system. See, e.g., the investigative
difficulties described in United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F.
Supp. 607, 610-11, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See also Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 5,
at 351-57. Under EFTS entries to an account would probably be stored together.
15. The problem has not gone unrecognized. In 1972 legislation was introduced in
Congress to limit the disclosure of bank information. H.R. 16246, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); S.3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S.3814, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Hearings
were held (Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3), but no subsequent action was
taken. Similar bills are currently pending before Congress. H.R. 8062, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); H.R. 9563, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.2200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Shortly before Treasury regulations were issued under the Bank Secrecy Act, a suit
was instituted in the Northern District of California to enjoin the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements of the Treasury regulations. See Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp.
1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974). The three-judge district court unanimously upheld
the recordkeeping requirements, but with one dissent declared the domestic currency
reporting provisions invalid. See generally 51 TEXAS L. REV. 602 (1973). The Supreme
Court sustained the Act and regulations in their entirety.
Recently, many banks have adopted more restrictive policies toward government in-
quiries. The American Civil Liberties Union has proposed a depositor contract which
provides for bank notification of the customer if attempts are made to summon his
records and prohibits the release of bank information absent depositor consent or a
judicially enforced subpoena. See CiviL LIBERTIES, Oct. 1972, at 3. A number of bank
associations have by resolution adopted the principles set forth in the proposal.
.Telephone Interview with John Shattuck, N.Y. Office of the Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Feb. 6, 1974. See also Memorandum from Bud King of Conn. Bankers Ass'n to chief
executive officers of Conn. banks, Oct. 10, 1972. Fifty-eight banks responding to a
statewide survey of Connecticut banks stated that they had adopted restrictive policies
on government access. Conn. Civil Liberties Union News, Feb. 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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II. Property Concepts and the Fourth Amendment
While a number of ad hoc legal doctrines might be utilized to se-
cure the bank depositor's privacy, 16 the most significant legal' 7 guar-
antee of freedom from government intrusion is the Fourth Amend-
ment. 8 However, application of the Fourth Amendment to depositors'
16. Government acquisition of bank records could conceivably be limited on the
theory that financial information is inherently "private" and therefore deserving of
constitutional protection under a broad "right to privacy." However, constitutional pro-
tection of information and activities per se as "private" has thus far been confined to
sexual matters. A standard of cultural revulsion seems to mark the boundaries of
the "right to privacy." Since revelation of a financial payment, even though the pay-
ment is accompanied by an "expectation of privacy," hardly evokes the same shock and
dismay as does an invasion of marital bedroom, protection for bank records would under
this privacy theory be unlikely. Nonetheless, exposure of a large number of trans-
actions together in a form which reveals underlying modes and habits of living may
sufficiently offend the senses as to generate a Griswold privacy right for financial
affairs; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has yet to adopt protective safeguards for privacy based upon such an informa-
tional metamorphosis. And, except in extreme instances that involve political sur-
veillance, the government usually examines bank data only to locate certain types of
payments or to identify relatively specific behavioral patterns. See, e.g., Bank Disclosure
Hearings, supra note 3, at 93-98.
It should also be noted that some courts have indirectly questioned the existence
of any confidentiality or privacy for negotiable payments. "[These) items were ne-
gotiable instruments in commerce and were never confidential from the time of their
creation." United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Harris
v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1969). But cf. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea
v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 231-32, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-8 (1970) (statute
requiring public officials to disclose all personal financial investments in excess of
$I0,000 held unconstitutional on, among other grounds, a right to privacy).
The First Amendment protects bank records where their divulgence would harm
the exercise of political rights. The Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment
right to privacy of association on several occasions, although not in the context of
bank records. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Note, Privacy in
the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
Two federal courts have quashed government subpoenas for bank records on First
Amendment grounds. United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393
U.S. 14 (1968). Both cases concerned records of contributions to political groups.
Also, bank records on proper occasion may be subject to protection when the at-
torney-client privilege applies, Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1971);
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964), or when judicial process is abused, see
note 17 infra.
17. As a practical matter notice of an impending investigation accompanied by
cooperation of the third party record holder will usually prevent an unreasonable
search. If the government is required to obtain a judicial order enforcing its informal
demand or summons, the motives and purposes of the search may be exposed, in-
viting judicial scrutiny, even in the absence of the litigant's "standing" to contest
the subpoena.
It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons
and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take
place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose . . . or for any
other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
However, the most serious threats to civil liberties are likely to occur when records
are sought extrajudicially without issuance of notice to the affected individual.
18. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
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interests in bank records encounters doctrinal difficulties. The basic
problem is whether depositors have a Fourth Amendment interest in
their checking account records maintained by a commercial bank, i.e.,
whether such records are within the set of objects and areas whose
search or seizure the individual can protest under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Individual X can clearly object under the Fourth Amendment
to an unreasonable search of his own home; but X is not protected
against a search-reasonable or unreasonable-of the house of his
neighbor Y.19 X has no Fourth Amendment interest20 in Y's house.
Of course, X's Fourth Amendment interest in his own house does not
protect X against all government intrusions into his home: Reason-
able searches, such as those pursuant to a valid warrant, are permis-
sible. But unless X has a Fourth Amendment interest in the object
seized or area searched, he lacks the prerequisites for a claim to relief.
Although individuals certainly consider their bank records to be
private, and although the Fourth Amendment has long been associated
with privacy,2 . the Amendment's protections are phrased largely in
terms of property: "the right of the people to be secure in their per-
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Federal and state courts have steadfastly prevented the assertion of jus tertii
claims under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-76 (1969). For a discussion of the unique California rule announced in People
v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), which allows the assertion of jus
tertii claims, see Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN. L. REV.
947 (1972). But see Kaplan v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 785, 93 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1971). See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAICNMENT PROCEDURF § 8.01(5) & Commentary
at 104-05 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search
and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970); Note, Standing to Object to an Unreason-
able Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 342 (1967).
20. The term "Fourth Amendment interest" will be used in this Note in lieu of
the frequently misapplied term "standing." See Albert, Standing to Challenge Ad.
ministrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 82 YALE L.J. 425,
427-42 (1974). Standing in search and seizure cases has often been given a broad
meaning to include three concepts: the constitutional need for a case or controversy;
jus tertii claims made by those not the direct victims of searches; and the class of
objects and areas which the individual can claim are protected directly under his
Fourth Amendment rights, i.e., those objects in which he has a Fourth Amendment
interest. See generally id. at 427-28, 465-72. Only the last aspect of "standing" is con-
sidered in this Note. However, courts often employ the broad term "standing" when
referring to the narrower meaning used here. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 449
F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971).
Although not usually found in the Fourth Amendment area, the "case or contro-
versy" aspect of "standing" was present in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S.
Ct. 1494, 1520-25 (1974). There plaintiff bank'' failure to allege participation in trans-
actions which under the Bank Secrecy Act must be reported prevented any "case or
controversy" from arising over the banks' challenge to those reporting requirements.
21. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961));
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting)
(1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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sons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ." Traditionally, lower federal
courts22 read the Amendment in its most literal sense; they equated
Fourth Amendment interests with property interests.23 Under this
proprietary standard an individual is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment against an unreasonable search of an area if he has an ownership
or possessory interest in the premises,24 or, under recent decisions, if
he lawfully occupies the premises at the time of the search. 25 An indi-
vidual's protection against unreasonable seizure of his "papers and
effects" has never been fully clarified. An early line of cases, mostly
in the Second Circuit, held that only one in possession of "papers and
effects" could complain of their seizure.26 However, the prevalent
view, dating back to dictum of Justice Field in 1878,27 is that owner-
ship of property alone gives an individual a sufficient interest to con-
test a seizure, without regard to possession.2 8 Either possession or
22. Prior to United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Supreme Court had never
expressly dealt with the bounds of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests in
objects seized. See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942); Annot., 96
L.Ed. 66, 67 (1952).
23. See, e.g., Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 266 (8th Cir. 1933). See also
Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property Concepts in Re-
solving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATm. U.L. REv. 1, 27-33 (1971); Weeks,
Standing to Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARiz. L. REv. 65 (1964).
24. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Grainger
v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946); MacDaniel v. United States, 294 F. 768,
771 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 593 (1924).
25. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (employee in business office al-
lowed to contest illegal seizure of employer's records from that office).
26. See United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir. 1951); United States
v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Reiburn, 127 F.2d 525,
526 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Printing Mach., 122 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1941);
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) (lack of
possession mentioned in dictum); United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963, 969 (S.D. Ga. 1923); cf. Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956). The position adopted by the cases re-
quiring possession can be criticized as reducing the "papers and effects" phrase in
the Fourth Amendment to surplusage. The "persons" and "houses" provisions con-
ceivably already provide Fourth Amendment coverage for documents in instances
where the individual has possession of those documents.
27. Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection . . . as if they were retained by the parties for-
warding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right
of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they
may be.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
28. See United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (3d Cir. 1972); Jeffers v.
United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Pielow v. United
States, 8 F.2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925); United States v. Elkins, 195 F. Supp. 757, 759
(D. Ore. 1961); United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376, 381 (,V.D. Pa. 1957); United
States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499, 502 (S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. Pete, 111 F.
Supp. 292, 293 (D.D.C. 1953). Several recent circuit court decisions have reached the
merits of seizures of goods not possessed by defendants, perhaps implicitly as-
suming that owners of seized goods have a Fourth Amendment interest even when
not in possession of those goods. See United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir.
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ownership, however, was a prerequisite to assertion of a Fourth
Amendment claim.
A. A Traditional Approach: A Property Test Applied to Bank
Records
The overwhelming majority of lower federal courts, by stating that
the relevant documents are the bank's property and that the depositor
has no proprietary interest, have denied "standing" (i.e., a Fourth
Amendment interest) to depositors contesting a search or seizure of
their checking account records. 29 The statement from In re Upham's
Income Tax is typical:
The summons were on the bank to produce papers belonging
to the bank and in its possession. The Fourth Amendment does
not guarantee to a person security against search, reasonable or
unreasonable, in papers which are not that person's property and
are not in his possession."
The harshness of this proprietary interest doctrine is apparent.
Despite the existence of a confidential relationship between the bank
and its checking account depositors, bank records become indistin-
1973); United States v. Harding, 475 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1973); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y.
1969).
The Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the issue, but several opinions
indicate that ownership alone is sufficient. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,
230 n.4 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 n.1l (1969). See also
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
391 (1968); Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (Court refused to consider
search of apartment separate from seizure of defendant's goods, where apartment was
not residence of defendant, but as to which he had a key and free access).
But note that, if possession is relinquished and protected objects are placed where
they are easily accessible to unauthorized persons (such as on a sidewalk or in an
open area, the claimant may be considered to have implicitly consented to a search
and seizure), thereby relinquishing his Fourth Amendment interest. See pp. 1467-68
infra.
29. See Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v.
United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618-19 (10th Cir. 1968); O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d
43, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966); In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85 (9th Cir.),
petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183,
187-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); United States v. Peoples Deposit
Bank & Trust Co., 112 F. Supp. 720, 723-24 (E.D. Ky. 1953) aff'd, 212 F.2d 86 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954); In re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737,
738 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930, 933 (D. Mass. 1928); cf. Pollard
v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 258-59 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
But cf. United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1969); Stark
v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1248-49 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af'd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974). See also Zimmerman
v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583, 586 (3d Cir. 1939); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
30. 18 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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guishable from the papers of other witnesses for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. 31 Since bank records are generally not owned
by the depositor, strict application of the proprietary interest test de-
nies Fourth Amendment protection even if the government steals or
fraudulently obtains the documents.
Although the Supreme Court clearly sustained the validity of bank
recordkeeping in California Bankers Association v. Shultz3 2 and has
previously upheld the constitutionality of administrative subpoenas,33
the Court has never considered a depositor's right to contest a search
or subpoena of his bank records.34 In Donaldson v. United States,35
however, the Court arguably adopted a proprietary interest test for
determining Fourth Amendment interests in an analogous third party
record situation. Donaldson denied a taxpayer's attempt to intervene
as of right in a proceeding brought to enforce an Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) summons directed to the taxpayer's former employer
ordering production of records of salary payments and other transac-
tions with the taxpayer.36 The case was principally concerned with
31. Absent special circumstances such as an attorney-client privilege, individuals
have no grounds to contest the seizure-unreasonable or not-of papers belonging to a
third party such as a witness. The absence of a Fourth Amendment interest and the
inability to assert jus tertii claims precludes any grounds for objection. See DeMasters
v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85 n.ll (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936
(1963); note 19 supra. The relationship between a bank and its depositors is not sub-
ject to an evidentiary privilege. See Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319-20
(9th Cir. 1969).
32. 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974).
33. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), afJ'g per curiam, 295 F. 142
(S.D. Ala. 1924).
34. In United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 267 U.S. 576 (1925) no de-
positors' claims were presented: The bank itself was contesting the constitutionality
of the enforcement of administrative summons. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974), the Court apparently concluded that the depositor's Fourth
Amendment objections were premature. See note 59 infra.
35. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
36. Donaldson, a rather complex case, consists of several basic holdings. First, the
case primarily decides that a taxpayer may not intervene as of right under FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2) in a proceeding to enforce an IRS summons merely because his tax
liability is the underlying subject of the summons. Id. at 527-30. The taxpayer must
demonstrate some "significantly protectable interest" to intervene as of right. Id. at
531. Second, the Court determined that the taxpayer Donaldson lacked such a sig-
nificantly protectable interest, and in doing so stated that the taxpayer had no "pro-
prietary interest" in the records which would allow him to intervene. Id. at 530-31.
It is the implications of this second holding which are relevant to this Note. Third,
the Court stated that even though the taxpayer could not intervene as of right, a
court may allow permissive intervention where the taxpayer asserts abuse of process
claims or claims that a summons is being used for an improper purpose. Id. at 529,
531. The Court noted that even if such intervention is disallowed, the taxpayer could
assert his claims at a later time if the government attempts to use evidence gathered
wrongfully in a subsequent trial. And finally, the opinion discusses the use of ad-
ministrative summonses for investigations in which criminal prosecution may result.
It holds that dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964), prohibits at
most the use of summonses in "an investigation solely for criminal purposes."
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the requisites of intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and not with the Fourth Amendment. However, in distinguish-
ing those objects in third party hands in which Fourth Amendment
protection might be extended, the Court stated that the corporate
records sought were "records in which the taxpayer has no proprietary
interest of any kind, which are owned by the third person, which are
in his hands, and which relate to the third person's business transac-
tions with the taxpayer."3 7 This language seems to suggest that a pro-
prietary interest in documents is necessary to assert Fourth Amend-
ment objections to any seizure, summons, or subpoena of the records. 38
Several lower court cases following Donaldson have apparently so
read the opinion and have used a proprietary interest test to deny
bank depositors' intervention in summons enforcement proceedings,
thus impliedly holding that depositors without proprietary interests
also have no Fourth Amendment claims.39
While this interpretation of Donaldson is certainly plausible, two
caveats must be entered. When it spoke of "proprietary interest," the
Court may have been referring only to intervention rights under Rule
24(a)(2) 40 and not to the Fourth Amendment. The opinion stated
37. 400 U.S. at 530.
38. Viewed in this manner, the Donaldson Court adopts the position set out in
the Brief for the United States at 16-19, id. The government there argued that only
two types of "interests" would allow taxpayers to intervene: proprietary interests and
claims of evidentiary privilege. Implicitly, if these are the only types of "significantly
protectable interests," then no Fourth Amendment claims could exist outside the
bounds of proprietary interest or evidentiary privilege. Since bank depositors have
neither, they would therefore have no Fourth Amendment interest. This reading of
Donaldson is buttressed by the Court's disapproval of lower court decisions which
allowed bank depositors to intervene in proceedings to enforce summonses issued to
their banks (and conversely approved holdings which had not permitted intervention).
See 400 U.S. at 530; United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1969); Justice v. United
States, 365 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1966). The two lower court opinions approved by
Donaldson, O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43, 44 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
969 (1966) and In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7-8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965),
utilized a proprietary interest test to prevent depositors from asserting rights in their
bank's records.
39. See United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1251 n.3, 1252 (7th
Cir. 1972); SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 702-03 (D. Minn. 1973); United States v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 363 F. Supp. 629, 631-33 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Northwest Pa.
Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp. 607, 612, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Smith v. Switzer, 73-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9490 (W.D. Pa., May 30, 1973). See also United States v. Luther, 481
F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer lacked proprietary interest in corporate records);
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 458 n.4 (6th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer had no
proprietary interest in attorney's records); United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4
(6th Cir. 1971) (no proprietary interest or privilege in accountant's records); cf. Fifth
Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 332 (2d Cir. 1973) (depositors have no
cause of action for bank's voluntary surrender of signature cards to F.B.I. agents).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) specifically allows intervention as of right by an in-
dividual who has "an interest relating to the property . . . which is the subject of the
action" and who "is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest."
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that "there is no ...constitutional issue in the case" 4 1 and nowhere
mentioned the Fourth Amendment in determining whether the tax-
payer had a "significantly protectable interest."42 Since only "routine
business records" were involved, the Court may have justifiably as-
sumed ab initio that the taxpayer could raise no Fourth Amendment
claims. Arguably, with this assumption in mind the Court then found
it necessary to hold that the taxpayer also lacked any proprietary
interest, since proprietary interests would have given him separate
grounds for intervention under Rule 24 even in the absence of Fourth
Amendment interests. 43 Putting this argument aside, Donaldson does
not hold that a proprietary interest is necessary to protect the seizure
or summons of all types of third party records. The Court noted that
the records sought by the government were not "in the hands of [the
taxpayer's] attorney or his accountant, with the attendant question of
privilege, or even in the hands of anyone with whom the taxpayer
has a confidential relationship of any kind. '44 Confidential relation-
ships are thus an additional source of individual rights; and the Court
arguably implies that confidentiality may give rise to "significantly
protectable interests" even in circumstances where no evidentiary
privilege exists. Donaldson may thus leave open the possibility that
proprietary interests will not be the sole determinant of Fourth
Amendment rights when a confidential relationship is before the
Court.4 5 Moreover, in holding that taxpayers may permissively inter-
41. 400 U.S. at 522. The Court, in stating that there was no "constitutional issue,"
was merely reiterating the settled doctrine that the issuance and enforcement of IRS
summonses are constitutionally permissible means of obtaining the production of docu-
ments, i.e., that apart from the facts of any particular case, the practice of issuing
summonses does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Shlom, 420
F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970) (IRS summons that is
reasonable in scope and issued for proper purpose does not "constitute an unlawful
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 295 F. 142, 143-44 (S.D. Ala. 1924), afj'd per curiam, 267 U.S.
576 (1925) (where information sought was relevant and material to investigation of
taxpayer, IRS could constitutionally require bank to produce documents through
issuance of summons; individual taxpayers' claims were not before the court); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Pikeville, 274 F. Supp. 283, 284-85 (E.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Justice v. United States, 390 U.S. 199 (1968) (section 7604 of
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 authorizing judicial enforcement of IRS summons is con-
stitutional and not violative of the Fourth Amendment).
42. 400 U.S. at 530-31.
43. Normally, of course, proprietary interests give rise to coexisting Fourth Amend-
ment interests. See p. 1445 supra. However, where a third party in custody and
control of records has authority to consent to a search and does so, the individual's
Fourth Amendment interest is relinquished (for purposes of that search) although
proprietary interests remain. In Donaldson the corporate record holder was willing
to consent to a government search. See 400 U.S. at 521.
44. 400 U.S. at 523.
45. But cf. United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 702-03 (D. Minn. 1973).
There a bank asserted that its confidential relationship with depositors prevented it
from being compelled to produce information concerning its depositors. The court re-
1449
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1439, 1974
vene in certain enumerated circumstances, Donaldson shows some
sensitivity to what are effectively Fourth Amendment claims. 40
B. Checks as Property and Mandatory Recordkeeping
Even within a narrow property orientation, however, depositors may
have a Fourth Amendment interest in certain checking account rec-
ords. At common law, cancelled checks (and arguably items such as
deposit slips and debit memos) are the depositor's property. 47 Since
ownership of records alone is probably sufficient to create a Fourth
Amendment interest, an individual should be able to challenge an
unreasonable search and seizure of his cancelled checks even while
these items are in the bank's custody. If possession of documents were
also deemed necessary, Fourth Amendment interest might still exist,
jected the bank's claim: Confidentiality notwithstanding, the bank's relationship with
depositors has no evidentiary privilege. The court also denied without discussion the
depositor's attempt to intervene.
46. Donaldson implied that taxpayer intervention may be allowed where a sum-
mons is issued in bad faith, solely to obtain evidence in a criminal prosecution, or
where enforcement would abuse the court's process (e.g., where the summons was for
documents not relevant and material to the investigation). 400 U.S. at 530-31, 536.
These claims are substantively identical to those which the taxpayer could assert under
the Fourth Amendment. See note 162 infra. The difference is mainly procedural: With
a Fourth Amendment interest the taxpayer is automatically a necessary party to a
proceeding to summon his bank records and is thereby entitled to notice.
47. Title to these items is of virtually no commercial importance and has not
been disputed in litigation in over fifty years. At common law a check became the
property of the drawer when paid; thereafter the bank held the check only as the
drawer's agent. See Van Dyke v. Ogden Say. Bank, 48 Utah 606, 615-16, 161 P. 50,
54 (1916); The Queen v. Watts, 169 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (C.A. 1850); Burton v. Payne,
172 Eng. Rep. 236 (K.B. 1827); Partridge v. Coates, 171 Eng. Rep. 976, 977 (K.B. 1824);
J. GRANT, A TRELTIsE ON THE LAW RELATING TO BANKERS AND BANKING 75-78 (1857);
2 J. MORSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING § 460 (6th ed. 1928). See
also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-201, 4-105(d), 4-208. The bank may retain pos-
session of the checks for bookkeeping purposes until the drawer's account is settled
(e.g., in the event of an overdraft). See 2 J. MORSE, supra, § 460. A few banks are
now contemplating the retention of cancelled checks to reduce processing and mailing
costs. Telephone interview with Matthew Hale, General Counsel to Am. Bankers Ass'n,
Washington, D.C., Mar. 29, 1974. Retention would not divest the drawer of title;
at most it would be a contractual alteration of rights, which need not be recognized
for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191-201 (1972); D.H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972) (contractual waiver of due
process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment by means of a cognovit
clause is not an issue of mere contract law; legal consequences of waiver are de-
pendent upon factors such as voluntariness, knowledge of consequences, disparity of
bargaining power, whether the contract is one of adhesion, and the individual's
receipt of benefits for his waiver of rights). The contractual alteration, if it derogated
the depositor's Fourth Amendment rights, might also be considered ineffectual for
lack of "good faith" or "ordinary care" under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103(1),
or would perhaps be considered unconscionable under § 2-302 of the UCC. See 22
U. FLA. L. REV. 482, 486 (1970).
Title to deposit slips has apparently never been litigated. The rationale supporting
the depositor's ownership of paid checks, however, could be applied to support the
customer's title in deposit slips. Deposit slips like paid checks are customarily re-
turned, and their evidentiary value is of primary use to the depositor. 2 J. MoRsE,
supra, § 460.
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based on "constructive possession." In Schwimmer v. United States4"
the Eighth Circuit held that a taxpayer's constructive, rather than
actual, possession of documents enabled him to assert his Fourth
Amendment claims against a government subpoena of the documents.
Schwimmer, a retired attorney, had placed his records in the custody
of a storage company for safekeeping. The court declared that the
government could not avoid "the question of an unreasonable search
and seizure . . . through the mere procedural device of compelling a
third party naked possessor to produce and deliver [the documents]." 49
The same argument applies to the depositor's cancelled checks and
deposit slips in bank custody. Banks are only slightly more than
"naked possessors" of cancelled checks. Except for the use of paid
checks in reconciling its statement with the depositor, a bank holds
these items as the depositor's agent; indeed, the depositor is said at
common law to have "constructive possession" of cancelled checks. 50
But regardless of whether the ability to assert Fourth Amendment
rights is based on ownership alone or on constructive possession, the
resulting Fourth Amendment protection is scant. A proprietary in-
terest test limits the depositor's Fourth Amendment interest to docu-
ments which he owns-original cancelled checks and deposit slips.
Banks usually retain these items for less than a month. Most govern-
ment searches are of microfilms and photocopies, items which, unlike
the originals, are the bank's property and, therefore, not subject to
the individual's Fourth Amendment claims.
Ironically this limited coverage may be expanded by the Bank
Secrecy Act, whose implementation has often been criticized as a
threat to civil liberties."' Mandatory bank photocopying under the
Secrecy Act 2 is functionally equivalent to a physical seizure. If checks
48. 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956); cf. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230
n.4 (1973).
49. 232 F.2d at 861.
50. See Burton v. Payne, 172 Eng. Rep. 236 (K.B. 1827); Partridge v. Coates, 171
Eng. Rep. 976 (K.B. 1824). Furthermore, the argument underlying the Schwimmer
decision is partially equitable in nature. Since Schwimmer could be personally com-
pelled by subpoena to produce the records (although not in his actual possession), he
should be allowed to contest their production by the third party. The same equities
are present in the case of bank retained cancelled checks.
51. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1526 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 1533 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra
note 3, at 21-24; Golembe 8: Melvin, Keeping It Confidential-The Bank Secrecy Act,
BANK MARKETING MANAGEMENT, Sept. 1972, at 15-16; 37 ALB. L. REv. 566, 579 (1973).
52. Banks must maintain copies of signature cards, ledger cards, and the deposi-
tor's social security or taxpayer identification number. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1973). Copies
of checks upon which the bank is drawee must be maintained unless 1) the item is
for less than $100, or 2) the check is for payrolls, employee benefits, government
agencies, or other exceptions specifically listed in § 103.34(b)(3). Until the amendment
of January 17, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 2175, 2176 (1973), there was no exemption for
checks under $100; for a discussion of this exemption, see Bank Disclosure Hearings,
supra note 3, at 78. Banks which at present photocopy or record checks deposited
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were removed from bank premises by government agents, photocopied
while in government possession, and then returned, the checks would
surely be considered "seized." Forcing bank employees, rather than
government agents on the federal payroll, to conduct the information
gathering on bank premises should not make the photocopying any
less a state-instigated search or seizure whose fruits are photocopies
and microfilms.53 Any attempt to use the copies as fruits of the search
may be forbidden by the Fourth Amendment protection given the
original checks.
5 4
In the context of bank recordkeeping there is a separation of time
between the events of physical seizure and actual government access.
This creates a novel set of problems regarding the conception of a
search, its reasonableness, and the imposition of Fourth Amendment
sanctions. Normally the reasonableness of a search and seizure is meas-
ured in "proportion to the end sought."' But where physical taking
and government acquisition of data are separate events, the "ends" of
to its customer's account in the ordinary course of business must retain such records
for two years pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.34(b)(10), 301.36(c) (1973). Other records
required by § 103.34 must be retained for five years. 31 C.F.R. § 103.36(c) (1973).
Under 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1973), the bank must report, on forms provided by
the Treasury Department, any currency transaction which exceeds SI0,000, unless the
exceptions of 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (1973) apply. Under 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.23 and 103.25
individuals who transport monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 into or out of the
United States must report such transactions to the government.
53. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1514 (1974) ("the bank
in making the records required by the Secretary [of the Treasury] acts under the
compulsion of the [Treasury] regulation").
Evidence obtained by private party searches is not subject to the Fourth Amend-
ment's proscriptions. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 206
(1968). However, when the search is planned, instigated by, or is conducted on behalf
of federal authority, Fourth Amendment sanctions apply even though private parties
carry out the search and seizure. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79
(1949); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 315-18 (1927); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Baker, 12 Cal. App. 3d 826, 837,
90 Cal. Rptr. 508, 515 (1971).
National banks, since M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), have
been considered federal instrumentalities. See generally Schwind & O'Leary, Are Na-
tional Banks Federal Instrumentalities Today?, 86 BANKING L.J. 99 (1969). Thus, they
could technically be considered government agents even without the compulsion of
the Bank Secrecy Act.
54. Accord, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Gov-
ernment agents in that case illegally seized and photocopied corporate records. The
corporation successfully moved for a return of the original records. However, the
government then attempted to use the photocopies as the basis for a subpoena to
compel production of the original records. The court barred evidentiary use of the
photocopies, since they were fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure.
The fact that bank photocopies are "required records" does not, of course, eliminate
the depositor's Fourth Amendment interest. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582 (1946) (defendant allowed to assert Fourth Amendment claim even though items
seized were gas rationing coupons that were "public documents" which defendant was
required to keep at his place of business); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d
261 (8th Cir. 1933) (bank examiners could reveal to the Justice Department evidence
concerning illegal activity of bank officers obtained in general audit of bank, but
officers could assert claims of illegal search in respect to their own private papers).
55. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
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the seizure cannot be determined without reference to the unknown
purposes of future government inquiries. 5 One approach is to view
government acquisition of bank data as completing the "seizure."
Fourth Amendment sanctions apply only when government access is
attempted. Reasonableness is then judged according to the purposes
of the actual government access.
5 7
A technically difficult problem to resolve is the identification of the
records deemed to be "fruits" of a government-instigated seizure.
Under a proprietary view of the Fourth Amendment an individual's
protected interest is limited to copies of depositor-owned documents
made or maintained pursuant to a federal statute. Prior to the Secrecy
Act a number of banks were already copying all of their depositors'
cancelled checks.55 Since their actions are undertaken independently
56. If a court presumes that the government will engage in only illegal surveil-
lance, photocopying of records needed for sound bank regulation may unwisely be
prohibited. The Court in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974)
avoids this error in sustaining the recordkeeping provisions of the Bank Secrecy
Act and Treasury regulations. Left unguarded is the complementary pitfall: By pre-
supposing only legitimate government access to bank records, the Court would ex-
tinguish individuals' Fourth Amendment claims. Once record maintenance standing
alone is deemed a completed, reasonable seizure, bank microfilms would no longer be
tainted fruits as to which depositors could invoke Fourth Amendment protection.
Valid regulatory purposes would thus be used to shelter later, unreasonable govern-
ment searches of the microfilms (in which the depositor has no proprietary interest).
57. Assuming arguendo that the Court in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94
S. Ct. 1494 (1974), was operating within a proprietary interest orientation, the Court
left unclear its view of this theoretical problem. Justice Rhenquist's blunt statement
is of little help: "That the bank in making the records . . . acts under the com-
pulsion of the [Treasury] regulation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing
so it neither searches nor seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amend-
ment right." Id. at 1514. Since a physical seizure undeniably occurs when documents
are obtained to be photocopied, what Justice Rhenquist must be saying is that, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, no "seizure" takes place which invades depositors' rights.
Three interpretations of this statement then present themselves. First, depositors have
no Fourth Amendment interest in original cancelled checks, let alone bank micro-
films, which would allow them to protest a seizure. Second, even if Fourth Amendment
interests exist, mandatory recordkeeping is a reasonable seizure, complete unto itself.
Third, depositors' Fourth Amendment claims, if they exist, are premature and will
be considered only when the government attempts to obtain access to the records.
The first explanation seems unlikely. At no point does the opinion discuss the
proprietary status of cancelled checks or Fourth Amendment doctrine as to protection
of objects owned but not possessed. Choosing between the second and third inter-
pretation is extremely important in determining the depositor's subsequent rights,
but the Court gives little guidance. The Court's statement that subsequent government
access to the records would "be controlled by existing legal process," id. at 1513,
does not necessarily imply the ability to assert Fourth Amendment interests, par-
ticularly since this phrase immediately precedes the majority's discussion of an in-
dividual's lack of rights to contest third party summons.
58. Prior to the Bank Secrecy Act most banks maintained copies of checks drawn
on out-of-town banks and sent for collection. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l
Bank of Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616, 619 (S.D. Ala. 1946). Many small and intermediate
size banks and some large banks also photocopied all or most of their depositors'
cancelled checks. However, the extent and period of recordkeeping did not necessarily
correspond to the Treasury regulations discussed in note 52 supra. For example, the
First New Haven National Bank usually retained copies of out-of-town checks de-
posited with it for little more than one year. Interview with Donald Redfield; Comp-
troller of First New Haven Nat'l Bank, in New Haven, Conn., Oct. 9, 1973. Regu-
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of the Act's requirements, it may not be proper to characterize their
records as products of a government-instigated "seizure." However,
a factual determination of which records were copied solely in com-
pliance with the Act would result in differences in Fourth Amend-
ment protection from bank to bank. Alternatively, to declare all
record-maintenance under the Act to be state action would produce
a vast expansion of Fourth Amendment interests-a curious twist of
fate since the Secrecy Act was passed as a measure to impose stricter
controls on white collar crime.59 A middle ground might be sought
by adopting a set of conclusive evidentiary presumptions concerning
"state action" and photocopying.0° Even in this task the structure of
the Treasury regulations requiring recordkeeping creates identifica-
tion problems. Amended regulations require banks to copy only
items in excess of $100.61 Yet the cost of sorting is so expensive that
many banks find it cheaper to duplicate all items. 2 Arguably, photo-
copying resulting directly from the regulations' economic impact
should also be considered state-instigated, but that result is by no
means logically compelled.
These difficulties make it clear that any protection dependent upon
the proprietary status of bank records is tenuous at best. The argu-
ment is suspended by a thread of legal history. The 19th century
cases63 which recognize the depositor's property interest in paid checks
have remained unquestioned precisely because there has been no genu-
ine need-commercial or otherwise-to relitigate the issue. Further-
lations under the Act now require retention for two years. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.36(c),
103.34(b)(3), 103.34(b)(6), 103.34(b)(10) (1973). Some large banks did not maintain photo-
copies of their depositois' checks, because it was cheaper to self-insure against loss
of items than to establish extensive recordkeeping machinery. See H.R. REP. No. 975,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). The five largest banks in California fell into this latter
category and maintained very few photocopies. Telephone Interview with Andrew J.
Shephard, Pres. of the Exchange Bank of Santa Rosa, Immediate Past Pres. of the
Cal. Bankers Ass'n, in Santa Rosa, Cal., Oct. 19, 1973.
Variance in bank recordkeeping practices is also noted in Secrecy Act Hearings, supra
note 5, at 72-74, 320-21, 325-27, 340. See also Bank Disclosure, Hearings, supra note 3,
at 86.
59. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1500-02 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 16 (1970); Jurisdictional Statement of George P.
Shultz at 16-17, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, supra; Golembe & Milvin, supra
note 51, at 15, 16.
60. A court could presume, for example, that banks in their ordinary course of
business copied only items in excess of $10,000 and only checks deposited which
were drawn on out-of-town banks. Thus, state action would be deemed to exist with
respect to all photocopies made under the Secrecy Act, except for a small number of
items copied under 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(1) (1973), and items copied under 31 C.F.R.
§§ 103.34(b)(4)-(9) (1973).
61. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1973).
62. See BANKSYSTEMS & Equip., Mar. 1973, at 18; Telephone Interview with Matthew
Hale, supra note 47.
63. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
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more, a court interested in the minutiae of check processing can occa-
sionally find the property connection (and thereby the depositor's
Fourth Amendment interest) severed by trivial variances in banking
practice. For example, if a bank microfilms checks before the drawer's
account is debited, the drawer has no proprietary interest (i.e., no title
to the instrument) at the time the seizure occurs and therefore has no
Fourth Amendment claim.64 The entire argument thus remains in-
herently fragile due to adherence to technicalities of property law and
banking practice. Such technicalities produce distinctions bearing no
rational relationship to any underlying concern for privacy.65
C. Information as Property
The property approach to the Fourth Amendment is not without
expansive potential, however, as demonstrated in Brex v. Smith66 and
Zimmerman v. Wilson , 1 7 which are curious aberrations from the tra-
ditional treatment afforded bank records. The cases involve attempts
of government agents to subpoena depositors' bank records in order
to obtain evidence for civil purposes and to investigate possible crim-
inal activity. In construing the nature of Fourth Amendment interests,
Brex and Zimmerman rely upon property doctrine but safeguard bank
depositors' privacy by conceptualizing information as property:
It is the information the bankers' books contain, and not the
books in which that information is recorded, that is the property
right of these taxpayers, a property right this court protects by
injunctive relief.68
The scope of Fourth Amendment protection is increased by enlarging
the concept of property. Information becomes the object seized, and,
as an object owned by the depositor, subject to Fourth Amendment
64. An electronic funds transfer system, discussed in notes 12-13 supra, would
eliminate all vestiges of property owned by the depositor-and thereby any Fourth
Amendment interests-despite the fact that no basic change in character of the re-
lationship between depositor and bank has occurred.
65. The district court in Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (N.D. Cal.
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S.
Ct. 1494 (1974), avoided "the technical question whether customer's checks, as such,
become the property of the bank during the banking process" in analyzing Fourth
Amendment protection of bank records. The Supreme Court did not address the issue.
66. 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929).
67. 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). The novel holding of this case was reversed at least
as to the brokerage records involved, however, in Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d
583 (3d Cir. 1939).
68. 81 F.2d at 849.
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protection.69 The Brex and Zimmerman opinions, however, also sug-
gest other grounds for their holdings70 and thus become imprecise
minglings of property, privacy, and Fourth Amendment doctrines.
Moreover, the approach requires a marked extension of the common
law, which has traditionally recognized information as property only
in the form of commercially valuable information. 71 Without the
"commercially profitable" criteria, it is difficult to determine in what
information and under what conditions the property right arises.72
Nonetheless, from the perspective of the Fourth Amendment, the
theory of information as property is an open road to innovation.7 3
III. Informational Control and Expectations of Privacy
Although historically linked with property, the Fourth Amendment
was designed as a protection of the individual's privacy from govern-
mental abuse, specifically from the government's use of writs of as-
69. The results of both cases suggest that ownership of such property, even absent
possession, is sufficient to grant standing. Neither case treats as separate issues the
seizure of records and the search of the banks; cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951) (discussed in note 28 supra). Zimmerman may also adopt a theory of con-
structive possession by regarding "bankers and brokers as mere agents." 81 F.2d at 849.
70. A right to privacy is mentioned in 81 F.2d at 849, and in 104 N.J. Eq. at
390-91, 146 A. at 36. The Brex opinion also has overtones of both abuse of process
and equitable action to prevent irreparable destruction of property rights. 104 N.J. Eq.
at 387-90, 146 A. at 35-36.
71. See generally International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 251 (1905); Pearson
v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); McMann v. SEC,
87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Dodge Co. v. Construction
Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903); A. W.STIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
324-25 (1970); Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691, 693, 701 (1938); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
200-01 (1890).
72. As noted by A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 213 (1971), "resort to property
is objectionable in that it involves the manipulation of a conclusory label." See
generally id. at 210-16.
73. State courts, which normally adjudicate the existence of property relationships,
may heed the directions by Katz v. United States:
[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by
other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely
to the law of the individual States.
389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
Moreover, recognition of proprietary rights to create a "wealth of privacy" is con-
sistent with Professor Reich's thesis that property has historically served "to guard
the troubled boundary between individual man and the state." Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). "Property draws a circle around the activities of
each private individual. . . . Within that circle . . . he is master, and the state must
explain and justify any interference. . . . The Bill of Rights also serves this function
. . . [but] in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of
private property." Id. at 771. See generally id. at 769-74.
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sistance and general search warrants.7 4 Physical embarrassment and
harassment were among the evils feared.7 5 But also prominent in the
Amendment's creation was the threat of government authorities search-
ing through private books and papers to glean evidence of wrong-
doing. In particular the framers sought to incorporate the decision
of Entick v. Carrington"0 into the Constitution.77 That case involved
a civil suit against agents of the Crown for their seizure of the books
and papers of John Entick, an author who, Lord Halifax believed,
had published several seditious pamphlets. In outlawing the use of
general warrants Entick v. Carrington was concerned with more than
physical intrusion: another aspect of privacy-the individual's loss of
control of information-was at stake. Lord Camden's famous opinion
expressed abhorrence that the individual's "house is rifled, his most
valuable secrets are taken out of his possession .... ,,7s A fear that "the
secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be
thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger" 79 prompted
the court's holding.
The Fourth Amendment's drafters were thus concerned with pri-
vacy in the sense of control over information."0 However, written
against the background of a 1791 society in which property relation-
ships were sufficient to protect the individual's privacy,8' the Fourth
74. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965). For descriptions of the history of the
Fourth Amendment, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-11 (1967); Stanford v.
Texas, supra, at 481-85; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1959); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
75. Colonists reportedly "complained that 'our houses and even our bed chambers
are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and
plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as
menial servants.'" R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 25 (1955), quoted
in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 315 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
77. In Stanford v. Texas the Court described Entick v. Carrington as "a wellspring
of rights now protected by the Fourth Amendment." 379 U.S. at 484. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886), asserts a similar proposition, noting that the Entick
case was "in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment."
78. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1064.
79. Id. at 1063.
80. Professor Alan Westin defines privacy as
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1970).
81. D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEw ENGLAND 25-44 (1972), discusses in de-
tail the contributions to colonial privacy made by the sparsity of population, the
linear design of towns, the large acreage lots, and the architecture of homes-all
factors that reflect real property distribution and relationships. Indeed, "[t]he only
kinds of searches and seizures that [the Framers] knew about involved physical in-
trusions and the seizure of persons and tangible things." Hufstedler, The Directions
and Mis-Directions of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
546, 552 (1971).
1457
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1439, 1974
Amendment refers to only one mode of informational control-owner-
ship of property.
8 2
Dramatic increases in urbanization s3 and technology have caused
property and privacy interests to diverge. Economic specialization has
largely supplanted the individual's house or papers as repositories for
personal information; computers are more efficient. There is today
dependence upon hospitals and doctors' offices rather than upon bed-
side physicians,8 4 telephonic communications rather than direct con-
versation,8 and bank-intermediated transactions in place of direct
payments, 6 all of which generate second or third party records. Rather
82. Liberty and property were closely linked in the Framers' minds and speech.
Philbrick, supra note 71, at 713. Professor Charles Reich also states, "[T]he idea of
privacy being invaded in the way it can be today never occurred to the people who
wrote the Bill of Rights . . . [but] every way in which they understood privacy
• . . [was] protected . . . in the Constitution." Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1966).
The Drafters' choice of property terms might have been dictated by another factor:
Authority to seize goods was based upon the sovereign's assertion of a superior property
interest in the goods themselves. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303-06 (1967);
Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
474, 475 (1961).
83. In 1790 less than six percent of the United States population was in urban
areas. The percentage had grown to 35 percent by 1890 and to 73 percent by 1970.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATEaS: 1972, at 5,
17, 24 (1972).
84. Besides a mental institution in Williamsburg, Virginia, the only hospital func-
tioning in the United States prior to 1791 was in Philadelphia. The number of
patients treated by the Philadelphia hospital was small-only 89 per year in 1754-55.
See F. PACKARD, THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES 174, 340, 364 (1901);
M. RISLEY, THE HOUSE OF HEALING 215-32 (1961). By contrast there were over 7,000
hospitals and mental institutions in the United States in 1970. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 83, at 71.
85. Sources gathered by D. FLAHERTY, supra note 81, at 117 n.10, indicate that
letter writing prior to 1800 was uncommon-less than one and a half letters per
person per year-and was mostly confined to merchants and the wealthy. Without
telephones or a widely used postal service, communication was necessarily direct be-
tween individuals. In 1971, by contrast, the Post Office was handling 51 billion pieces
of first class mail each year-over 250 letters per capita. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 83, at 491. The telephone company appears as an equally formidable in-
termediary. Ninety percent of all households have telephones, totaling over 91 million
residential telephones. An enormous quantity of records is generated: on average more
than 500 million calls are made daily, of which 29 million are long distance. Id. at 493.
86. The colonial "bank" existed principally to issue paper notes; not until the
chartering of the Bank of North America in 1781 did the first commercial bank-in
today's terminology-operate in America. See W. SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION
OF CHECKS 42-43 (1926); W. WARNER, BANKING 48-60 (1895). The absence of deposit
banking almost completely inhibited the development of checks; specie and paper cur-
rency were overwhelmingly the medium of exchange during the colonial era. See
W. SPAHR, supra, at 37-43; A. DAVIS, THE FUND AT BOSTON IN NEw ENGLAND 13-18 (1903).
See also W. GOUGE, PAPER MONEY AND BANKING, pt. II, 53-54 (1833). In 1791, when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted, there were at most six banks in the United
States and therefore necessarily few checking accounts. See W. GOUGE, supra, at 42;
W. SPAHR, supra, at 49.
Widespread consumer use of checking accounts-described as a "shift from class to
mass banking"-is only a recent phenomenon that accompanied the expansion of credit
after World War II. See R. ALDOM, A. PURDY, R. SCHNEIDER & H. WI'rINGHAM, AU-
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than suppress personal information or confine it to his home, which
would be-if not impossible-grossly inefficient and severely restrictive
of social and financial intercourse, the individual chooses third party
intermediaries whom he believes will protect his privacy. Custom,
statutory restrictions, and private remedies serve to enforce these ex-
pectations of privacy.87 Yet, under a "proprietary interest" interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, these nonproperty modes of informa-
tional control go unrecognized: Privacy is protected only if embodied
in a proprietary relationship.
Fourth Amendment law has exhibited a slow but marked recogni-
tion of the divergence of property and privacy. The Supreme Court,
in particular, has given increasing weight to concepts of privacy;
Fourth Amendment protection has been both curtailed within and
expanded beyond the limits of property law. "House" now includes
an "apartment"88 or "business office," 89 both places where one may
have an expectation of privacy. By contrast, individuals cannot assert
a Fourth Amendment interest in open fields90 or in premises they
have leased to others,"' despite the existence of ownership and the
violation of a property right enforceable at common law through a
trespass action. Proprietary interest, as a requisite to contest the search
of premises, is now satisfied by lawful occupancy of the place
searched.2 But until 1967, property relationships-even if only occu-
pancy-still delineated the scope of Fourth Amendment rights.
In 1967, Katz v. United States93 significantly revised the conceptual
method of determining the existence of Fourth Amendment interests.
In holding that electronic surveillance of a telephone booth was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not focus upon
possessory or occupant interests (i.e., proprietary interests) in the tele-
TOMATION IN BANKING 13-15 (1963); B. YAViTz, AUTOMATION IN COMMERCIAL BANKING
7-17 (1967). Projections indicate that by 1975 some 29 billion checks will be processed
annually drawn on 92 million checking accounts. 85 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 992 (1962).
87. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970) (telephone company or
its employees prohibited from divulging the "existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning" of communications); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1953)
(physician-patient evidentiary privilege); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (physicians may be liable for unauthorized disclosure of
information concerning patients). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970) (credit re-
porting agencies subject to statutory limitations and penalties for release of infor-
mation gathered on consumers).
88. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
89. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
90. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). At common law, governmental
entry into even an open field required a warrant. Kaplan, supra note 82, at 481.
91. See United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954).
92. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
93. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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phone booth or the surrounding space.9 4 Instead, the defendant's
Fourth Amendment interest depended upon the existence of "privacy
upon which he justifiably relies." 9 The Court's holding and the con-
cept of "constitutionally justified expectations of privacy"' , are con-
ceptually independent of property doctrine. Primary emphasis shifts
from ownership, possession, and occupancy to expectations.
Despite this conceptual change, recent cases have not yet fully ex-
plored the implications of Katz. Mancusi v. DeForte,97 decided two
years after Katz, did speak in terms of "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy." But in holding that an employee could contest the illegal sei-
zure of files in his employer's office building, the Supreme Court
directed attention to the employee's possession of the space in his of-
fice and his occupancy at the time of the search. Thus the decision
relies heavily on a pre-Katz concept, the "constitutionally protected
area."9 s
Proprietary interest tests, however, have been altered by "justified
expectations of privacy." In People v. Krivda0 the California Supreme
Court, which adopted the Katz standard for state court decisions, held
illegal a warrantless search of a trash can left for collection by the side
of the road. The court implied that the property relationships were
not necessary to its conclusion that an expectation of privacy existed.1 00
The dissenting opinion gave weight to the proprietary status of the
trash, but stated that such status was not controlling.101 The property
relationship involved was important because it helped determine
expectation of privacy: "That expectation [of privacy], however, is
inextricably bound up in the physical location of the trash cans."'1 2
Both majority and dissent thus looked beyond proprietary interests to
assess the claimant's Fourth Amendment interest.
94. The defendant Katz did not even occupy the space where the electronic
listening device was located, since the device did not penetrate the walls of the
booth. Id. at 352. See generally Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133, 136-39. "[T]he [Katz] opinion is inten-
tionally ambiguous, pointing the way to a new scope for the Fourth Amendment
while leaving the Court room to retreat." Id. at 138.
95. 389 U.S. at 353.
96. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
97. 392 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1968).
98. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-45 (1962).
99. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd on rehearing, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105
Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
100. 5 Cal. 3d at 364-67, 486 P.2d at 1267-69, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 66-69. In order to
decide expectations of privacy as well as the trash's proprietary status, the court
examined the effects of a municipal ordinance and of police rummaging through
trash. The court also focused on the suspect's subjective expectations.
101. Compare id., with United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1971) (trash
placed at the side of the road is abandoned property; no Fourth Amendment protection
can apply to it).
102. 5 Cal. 3d at 867, 486 P.2d at 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
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Katz has not eliminated property considerations-ownership, pos-
session, occupancy-but has changed their role from legal touchstones
for the Fourth Amendment to standards by which expectations of pri-
vacy are evaluated. Property criteria justifiably remain relevant; but
requiring a nexus of privacy with property would implicitly deny the
existence of a legally protectable interest for almost all third party
records. Bank depositors could conceivably claim an expectation of
privacy based on the fact that, through receipt of their cancelled
checks, they have historically had exclusive possession of all transac-
tional information not contained in the bank's ledgers. 10 3 Such a
Fourth Amendment interest would at least shield the names of payees
or endorsers contained in bank microfilms. But this "nexus" approach
is anomalous: Reembracing property tests, it converts expectations of
privacy into expectations of ownership, possession, or occupancy.
Although it denied Fourth Amendment protection, United States
v. White"'4 made the most progressive analysis of the nature of Fourth
Amendment interests. The Court in White explicitly focused on con-
trol over information, or more precisely, the defendant's lack of con-
trol over secrets revealed to a companion. The defendant claimed that
the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by concealing
an electronic transmitter on an informant. In holding that recordings
of his conversations with the informant were admissible evidence, the
Court stated that White could not justifiably expect "that a person
with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conver-
sation to the police."'10 5 White's lack of control over a companion's
behavior was held to preclude his Fourth Amendment claim:
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect
him when the same agent has recorded or transmitted the con-
versations. 06
103. The nexus is historical only. Banks have, since 1928, often retained photo-
copies or microfilm of cancelled checks to insure against lost items or spurious claims.
See generally Wharton, You're in the Pictures, AM. Bus., July 1955, at 14. But tra-
ditionally banks maintained few records concerning their depositors' checking accounts,
and the information contained in these documents was generally limited to dates and
amounts of debits and credits. With only few exceptions, the information, including
names of payees and endorsees, was not recorded. See Ledgers of the Hartford Bank,
Aug. 1792 to 1794; A. BARREIr, MODERN BANKING METHODS 146-65 (5th ed. 1907); III
R. WVESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRAGTICE 596-99 (1921). See generally A. BARZErIr,
supra, at 211-21; A. FISKE, THE MODERN BANKS 79 (1904) (after clearinghouses developed,
some banks would record additional information in "transit" ledger on checks sent for col-
lection); Interview with John C. Foley, retired Ass't Treasurer of the Chemical Bank,
New York City, Feb. 21, 1974 (some small country banks recorded names of payees
of its customers' checks).
104. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
105. Id. at 749.
106. Id. at 752. The dissents of Justices Harlan and Douglas also looked to the
defendant's control over information, and argued that the majority focused on the
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Judicial articulation of "justified expectations of privacy" has just
begun and the exact boundaries of the standard remain unclear.
Courts following the Katz decision appear to rely upon two broad
criteria to determine the existence of expectations of privacy and to
christen such expectations as "constitutionally justified": the actual
degree of the individual's control over information and the desirability
of such privacy or informational control. 07 The latter criterion is dif-
ficult to weigh. A court assessing the desirability of informational
control determines if such privacy has a significant impact upon the
values which the Fourth Amendment seeks to preserve, e.g., autonomy,
security, individuality.10 8 Since one's view of the desirability of pri-
vacy in various contexts is itself based upon conventional norms and
mores, 109 judicial evaluations of this criterion will undoubtedly vary.
Courts not surprisingly have focused on the more tangible criterion,
the actual existence of information control. Several decisions have
recognized that the individual's control over information is often
supported by constraints other than property relationships, e.g., a cus-
tomary, confidential relationship between the individual and the rec-
ordkeeper and the nature of that relationship," 0 an evidentiary privi-
lege,"' or statutes, ordinances, or common law concerning access to
wrong mode of informational control. White's ability to keep sounds from being trans-
mitted outside an enclosed area (rather than his control over his companion's behavior)
was perhaps the more significant issue. See id. at 760, 762-64, 787-90; cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
107. The two criteria are interrelated. A high degree of actual informational control
may indicate a societal belief that privacy is very desirable. And conversely, legal
recognition of privacy may be desirable in the circumstances simply because actual
informational control has caused many individuals to rely upon privacy.
Even though a high degree of informational control is present, however, the pri-
vacy involved may not be sufficiently desirable to give rise to a Fourth Amendment
interest; cf. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684
(1937) (Learned Hand, J., denying Fourth Amendment protection to records of stock
transactions).
108. These values are occasionally mentioned in cases and have been frequently
discussed in legal literature. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); A. WESTIN, supra note 80, at 31-51; Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAw & CoNTENMP.
PROB. 307 (1966).
109. See A. WEm, supra note 80, at 11-30; Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and
Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 288-96 (1966).
110. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973). Couch, a Fifth Amend-
ment case, applied the concept of "reasonable expectations of privacy" as a means of
determining Fifth Amendment protection. The taxpayer in Couch was held not to
have a reasonable expectation of privacy since, in giving records to her accountant,
she expected him to disclose much of the information to government authorities in
income tax returns. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971), utilizes similar
criteria, in holding that an accomplice cannot be expected to keep information on
criminal activities to himself.
111. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 523, 531 (1971) (taxpayer may intervene in administrative sub-
poena enforcement proceedings to assert attorney-client or any other evidentiary privilege).
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the information and its disclosure. 112 Through application of these
criteria a court-without exclusively relying upon property law-can
protect the modes of informational control which give rise to Fourth
Amendment interests. 1
13
When nonproperty constraints are considered, the depositor's ex-
pectation of privacy as to his checking account records becomes "justi-
fiable" and deserving of constitutional protection. Although ledger
card data are used to balance the bank's books, the banker has virtu-
ally no occasion to gain access to or make use of the underlying trans-
actional information." 4  Commercial banks have rigorously main-
tained the confidentiality of checking account transactions.1  Gen-
erally information is released to private parties only upon consent of
the depositor"t 6 and is confined to credit information." 7 Raw trans-
112. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr.
62, 68 (1971).
113. These criteria are flexible enough to distinguish certain types of records within
an otherwise protected mode of informational control. For example, even if other
records of a depositor's account are protected, signature card records of a bank de-
positor's account may not be sufficiently "private" to generate a Fourth AmendmentInterest; cf. Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 328, 332 (2d Cir.
1973). But cf. id. at 335 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
114. With the exception of a cursory inspection of the original item to insure that
the check is not postdated and that signatures and endorsements are genuine, bankers
rarely have any legitimate business use for the underlying transactional data. Once
a check is paid and returned, these data-names of payees, dates on checks, endorse-
ments, and other memoranda-are recorded only in microfilms of checks. A consider-
able effort may thereafter be required to obtain the information, see note 14 supra.
The cursory nature of the bank's inspection of checks cannot be overemphasized. The
banking system currently processes some 30 billion checks per year.
The increasing mechanization of the banking industry continues to reduce the
chances that any human agent would come into any direct, significant contact with
the underlying transactional information. Prior to the Bank Secrecy Act, the existence
of bank microfilms was only a byproduct of the banker's insurance against a lost
item-the information contained in the microfilm was rarely of use to the banker.
See note 103 supra; Secrecy Act Hearings, supra note 5, at 326-27, 349-50, 357.
This limited use of bank information and the purposes for which the banker
gathers data are criteria which readily distinguish bank records from other types of
second and third party records. For example, accountants obtain information ex-
pressly for use in preparing tax returns: Indeed, much of the information is to be
disclosed to the government; cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
But see United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 702-03 (D. Minn. 1973) (bank
records considered analogous to accountant's records).
115. See Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3, at 192-200, 228, 263-64; Secrecy
Act Hearings, supra note 5, at 313, 317-18; 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 482, 485 (1970). See
also Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961);
Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 479 (C.A.); N.
GouGE, supra note 86, at 219-20. The confidentiality of bank transactions is recog-
nized by a number of other countries. See Secrecy Act Hearings 365-68.
116. Listing a bank as a credit reference, however, is considered by most banks
to constitute an implied consent to release credit information. R. CHORLEY, LAW OF
BANKING 17, 172 (4th ed. 1960); Interview with Renate Betterton, Credit Manager of
the First New Haven Nat'l Bank, in New Haven, Conn., Feb. 19, 1974.
117. Policies vary from bank to bank, but customary limits on disclosure exist.
Upon verification that an inquiry is legitimate, a bank will normally disclose no
more than (1) maximum, average, or minimum balance (usually a rough estimate of
whichever the bank maintains), (2) the date the account was opened, (3) whether
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actional data usually desired by government agencies are never re-
leased to private parties, and breaches of this customary secrecy are
rare.118 This confidential relationship is supported by more than cus-
tom: Banks are under a legal obligation to maintain the secrecy of
their depositors' transactions. 1 Although the duty of secrecy is not
unqualified, 20 the courts have made it clear that the banker functions
as an agent in handling account information: He can release data
only if consistent with that role.12' Thus even without property
rights, the depositor has customary and legal rights to control the
revelation of checking account information.
22
Denial of a Fourth Amendment interest leads to the anomalous
the customer's balance at the time of the inquiry is sufficient to meet an existing
draft of a specified amount, (4) whether the account has been "satisfactory" or "un-
satisfactory." (An "unsatisfactory" evaluation may be subject to provisions of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act when used by a consumer reporting agency, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 2682m(b) (1970).) Interview with Renate Betterton, supra note 116; Interview with
Thomas Giaimo, Regional Operations Manager of the Conn. Bank and Trust Co., in
New Haven, Conn., Feb. 19, 1974; Interview with William Johnson, Ass't Cashier of
the 90 Park Ave. Branch of the Franklin Nat'l Bank, in New York City, Feb. 21,
1974. See also PATON's DIGEST § 19, reprinted in Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra
note 3, at 238-57.
118. See 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 482, 485 (1970). See also cases cited in note 115 supra.
119. There have been three cases expressly dealing with liability for disclosure and
all found liability to exist. Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961);
Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.). See also
Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 105 F.2d 583 (1939); Sparks
v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.
Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929). This duty of secrecy presents a striking contrast to
the notion that the bank is somehow a "stranger" to the depositor; cf. Harris v.
United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1969).
120. Exceptions to the duty of disclosure exist where the customer consents to a
release of information, where the bank must disclose data in its own business in-
terests, e.g., to collect an overdraft, or when a public duty mandates disclosure, i.e.,
"to prevent fraud or crimes." See Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank,
[1924] 1 K.B. 461, 473, 481 (C.A.); R. CHORLEY, supra note 116, at 16-17.
121. Generally the relationship of bank to depositor is characterized as that of
debtor to creditor because of the commercial needs of the banking industry. R.
CHORLEY, supra note 116, at 13-22. There is therefore a natural resistance to charac.
terizing the bank's obligations as those of an agent, trustee, or bailee, despite the
banking law's incorporation of facets of these relationships. However, for limited pur-
poses of handling account information, the duties of the banker appear to be those
of an agent. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 586, 367 P2d 284,
289 (1964), expressly adopted an agency formulation. The exceptions to the duty of
secrecy, see note 120 supra, are entirely consistent with the agency status. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395, Comment f (1957).
122. No case has specifically decided the issue of whether there is a duty of secrecy
as to inquiries of government officials. This exception would be somewhat anomalous
and justified only by the rationale that the government seeks information for the
public welfare and that investigating agents are presumed to adhere to legitimate
inquiries; cf. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624-25 (S.D. Ala.
1946). But courts, not enforcement agencies themselves, are the institutions which
usually balance "public welfare" against those of the individual. See p. 1468 infra.
An exception for government officials has never appeared in the few cases on bank
secrecy, and in Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929), the court ex-
pressly prohibited release of information to a public prosecutor. But cf. Tournier
v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 474 (C.A.) (in illustration
of a different point, the court discusses example of a police officer making inquiry
to bank without mention of subpoena or bank compliance).
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conclusion that, while safeguarded against all others, the depositor's
privacy would be nonexistent when the prying eye belongs to the gov-
ernment. Such a constitutional gap is highly questionable. Checking
account records "reveal much about a person's activities, associations,
.. beliefs,"' 2 3 "political allies, social connections, religious affiliation
... and so on ad infinitum."' 2 4 Loss of control over such information
would have a substantial adverse impact upon values the Fourth
Amendment seeks to preserve. Depositors' control over checking ac-
count data is thus a mode of informational control which deserves
Fourth Amendment protection surely as much as occupancy of tele-
phone booths.
This conclusion contradicts the holdings of a long line of lower
court cases which look exclusively to property relationships in deter-
mining depositors' rights in bank records. It is also contrary to Donald-
son v. United States 25 if, as several lower court opinions hold, Don-
aldson is read as restricting the Fourth Amendment to a protection of
proprietary interests. But arguably the Supreme Court had no such
restrictive intent. The particular result in Donaldson is completely
justifiable under the Katz standard since Donaldson dealt only with
routine corporate records involving no expectations of privacy. There
is sufficient dictum in the opinion to exempt confidential records
from a proprietary interest requirement, which thus allows subsequent
courts to apply an "expectation of privacy" analysis to bank records.
Nevertheless, the tenor of Donaldson, if not its holding, appears to
have hindered the development of Fourth Amendment law. Under
Donaldson's shadow neither litigants nor lower federal courts have
perceived the implications of Katz v. United States in the context of
third party records. None of the bank cases which deny depositors'
Fourth Amendment interests even mentions "expectations of pri-
vacy." 26 Yet, after two decades of freeing the Fourth Amendment
from property law, the Supreme Court does not seem likely to forget
Katz and return to property standards. California Bankers Association
v. Shultz bears out this contention. Although the majority opinion
never reached the issue, five justices argued that depositors may have
legitimate expectations of privacy in their bank records.127
123. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1526 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
124. Id. at 1529 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). See pp. 1447-50 supra.
126. See cases cited in notes 29 & 39 supra.
127. "In their full reach, the reports apparently authorized by the open-ended
language of the [Bank Secrecy] Act touch upon intimate areas of an individual's
personal affairs. . . . At some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would
implicate legitimate expectations of privacy." 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1526 (1974) (Powell, J.,
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IV. The Bank's Consent to Search
Even given the existence of depositors' Fourth Amendment in-
terests, an unreasonable search and seizure of bank records would
rarely, if ever, take place in the classic manner of breaking, entering,
and rummaging through papers: Searches of depositor records are
usually conducted with the consent of the bank.12 8 A banker's consent
-if effective-relinquishes the depositor's privacy and may extinguish
any Fourth Amendment claims. The dual issues of authority to con-
sent and voluntariness must therefore be examined.
A. Authority to Consent
Authority to consent is essentially based upon agency concepts, but
in the broad, nontechnical sense of the word "agency" which em-
braces all informal delegations of authority. Stoner v. California,120
a leading Supreme Court case, expressly adopted an agency formula-
tion in holding that a hotel's ownership of property (and also its right
to have janitors and maids enter guests' rooms for cleaning purposes)
was insufficient to give its employees authority to consent to a search
of the room rented by the defendant Stoner. The Court looked to
delegations of authority from the individual asserting Fourth Amend-
concurring) (joined by Blackmun, J.). "Customers have a constitutionally justifiable
expectation of privacy in the documentary details of the financial transactions re-
flected in their bank accounts." Id. at 1527 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "[T]he customer
of a bank, having written or deposited a check, has a reasonable expectation that
his check will be examined for bank purposes only-to credit, debit or balance his
account-and not recorded and kept on file for several years by Government decree
so that it can be available for Government scrutiny." Id. at 1534 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See id. at 1532-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concurs with Justice Douglas'
statement on depositor's expectations of privacy).
128. Obtaining records by means of an administrative summons unaccompanied
by a judicial enforcement order would technically be with the "consent," or more
correctly, the acquiescence, of the bank. The administrative summons, or pocket
subpoena, should be distinguished from the judicial subpoena. A bank need not
comply with an administrative summons; its only obligation, in the event of non-
compliance, is to make its objections known in good faith. Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440 (1964), held that sanctions could be imposed for failure to obey an ad-
ministrative summons only in cases of neglect, default, or contumacious refusal to
comply-situations which would be dissipated by an objcction to the summons inter-
posed in good faith. By contrast, compliance with a judicial subpoena is mandatory;
accordingly, the process of issuing court subpoenas is surrounded by judicial and
adversary safeguards. A judicial subpoena can be issued only by a court and will
bear its seal. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45. Prior to issuance of a judicial subpoena en-
forcing an administrative summons, an adversary hearing will usually be held at
which the summoned party can assert his objections. Reisman v. Caplin, supra, at
446. Rule 45 also gives the subpoenaed party the opportunity to interpose objections
upon a "motion made promptly."
129. 376 U.S. 483 (1964). Stoner purposely avoided the technicalities and "strained
applications of the law of agency" and "unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.'"
Id. at 488.
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ment claims.130 Stoner implicitly recognizes that property is important
only if relevant to authority derived from the individual Fourth
Amendment claimant.
To argue that the bank's ownership of documents creates con-
sensual authority misperceives the role of property. The bank's "cus-
tody and control" may imply a delegation of authority, but, where
unrelated to the individual's privacy involved, property interests do
not create an independent right to divulge another's secrets.'13 If the
bank's property rights are significant, it is in negating the expectation
of privacy necessary to give rise to depositors' Fourth Amendment
interests. But once a court deter-mines that the expectations of privacy
are justifiable, property loses independent significance as to the issue
of authority to consent.'
32
If presented with the question of divulging checking account rec-
ords, most bank customers would probably not grant the banker con-
sensual authority. However, a court might conclude that the depositor
has given the bank such "complete and unrestricted freedom" over
information "that he will be held to have accepted the risk that the
[banker] will consent to a search,"' 33 that is, the depositor may have
"implicitly authorize[d] another to consent to an invasion of his pri-
vacy."' 34 Once again, the divergence of property and privacy comes
to the foreground. The banker has complete physical control of rec-
ords, which in other contexts might conclusively demonstrate con-
130. It is important to bear in mind that it was petitioner's constitutional right
which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a
right which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly
or through an agent.
id. at 489.
131. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (even though landlord
accompanied officers making search of tenant's premises, landlord's consent, based on
clause in lease which gave him right to enter premises for purpose of viewing waste,
was ineffective); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (assistant hotel manager
could not give consent to search guest's room, despite guests' "implied or express
permission" to permit "such persons as maids, janitors, or repairmen" to enter room
"in the performance of their duties"); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1966) (freight carrier could not consent to search and seizure of package given
it for shipment, despite clause in tariff which authorized the carrier to open it for
inspection, if necessary); Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955) (land-
lord's control of premises not sufficient to give consent to police to pry open tenant's
locked cabinet); United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (employer not
authorized to consent to search of private parts of its desk used by employee); Bielicki
v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1962) (no effective
consent to search where owner of amusement park agreed to police installation of
pipe which would enable police to view homosexual activities in pay toilet stalls).
132. In Stoner and each of the cases cited in note 131 supra, the second or third
party's property interest was insufficient to grant it independent consensual au-
thority once the courts determined that the Fourth Amendment interests (i.e., jus-
tifiable expectations of privacy) were present.
133. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966).
134. Id.
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sensual authority. However, in dealing with the information con-
tained in those records, the banker actually has very little freedom:
He is bound by a legal duty of secrecy at least as to private parties.
The limitations ordinarily accompanying the banker's disclosure of
account data thus negate any attempt to imply customer authoriza-
tion and the customer's control remains paramount. 35 In the context
of a highly regulated and institutionalized industry with a tradition
of customer secrecy, there is no common sense notion that a bank's
access to information carries with it the authority to invade depositors'
privacy, or that the customer necessarily accepts such a risk. Since the
government bears the burden of proof in demonstrating valid con-
sent, 30 the ambiguity-at a minimum-regarding the bank's authority
would probably render the search unreasonable.
Recognition of a banker's power to consent is also unwise for sev-
eral policy reasons. Most consent searches involve an agent who is re-
lated to and aware of at least some of the principal's interests.
137
Bankers who release customer records may not even know the de-
positor, let alone be able to assess his particular desire for privacy.
With broad authority over thousands of accounts, the banker, in al-
lowing searches of checking accounts, preempts the neutral, detached
magistrate. It is the banker then who frequently balances the needs
of law enforcement agencies against the privacy interests of a depositor.
Courts have been extremely reluctant to place such power or decisions
in nonjudicial hands.' 38 The banker is ill-equipped to perform this
quasi-judicial role: He may yield too quickly to unsupported allega-
tions of "national security," or he may simply acquiesce to avoid the
bother of the whole affair.' 39 Since such extraneous factors may affect
135. Compare id., with United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
136. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). See also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
137. But cf. Note, Third Party Consent: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. Cm. L. REv.
121, 122-23 (1973).
138. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1972)
(neutral magistrate, not mere say-so of U.S. Attorney General, required for issuance
of a lawful wiretapping order); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-55
(1971) (state attorney general, as person in charge of the investigation and ultimate
prosecution, was not sufficiently neutral to determine whether warrant should issue);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (search of hotel room on police
officer's apparently reasonable suspicion illegal on grounds that absent exceptional
circumstances, "a magistrate's warrant for search may not be dispensed with").
See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971) (writ of replevin may not issue without
opportunity for a judicial, adversary hearing); Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note
3, at 46; cf. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1526 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("the potential for abuse is particularly acute where, as here, the legis-
lative scheme permits access to this information without invocation of the judicial
process").
139. The banking community itself does not desire to assume the responsibility of
these decisions. See Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3, at 228-29.
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the banker's decision, the depositor's Fourth Amendment interests
would be subject to the vagaries and potential inequities of the bank-
er's political and social views.
B. Public Duty Disclosure
There exists a limited number of instances where the bank may
disclose customer records based on a "public duty" exception to its
obligation of secrecy. This exception, which is not dependent on a
theory of consent, 140 was formulated in dictum in Tournier v. Na-
tional Provincial & Union Bank.'4 ' The duty appears to be simply
the civil obligation of any agent who of his own initiative discovers an
illegality. 42 Being the only party aware of the offense, the banker
must inform authorities if further crime and fraud are to be pre-
vented. However, this duty applies only if the bank itself discovers
the illegal act'4 3-an increasingly unlikely event as the number and
mechanization of bank transactions expand. 44 Where authorities al-
ready know of suspect activities and can utilize judicial process and
other lawful means to investigate, the banker's public duty is no
longer paramount when juxtaposed with customer obligations. The
possibility that authorities may attempt to deny to depositors Fourth
140. An individual always assumes the risk that an employee or agent performing
his duties may expose an illegality to proper authorities. See United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971). Fourth Amendment protection covers an agency relationship which
embodies informational control only to the extent that the agent is limited in his
freedom to disseminate the information. No agent is ever bound to keep a discovered
illegality secret. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957). When an agent
discovers illegal conduct, his principal has no right to control the agent's dissemina-
tion of that particular information. In his relationship with the agent involving that
specific information, the principal no longer has the control which would give rise
to justifiable expectations of privacy.
141. [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.).
142. Id. at 473.
143. Cf. R. CHORLEY, supra note 116, at 17 (the public duty exception to confiden-
tiality between bank and depositor exists, as one example, where a bank finds a
customer trading with the enemy in time of war). Apparently, "public duty" has
never been described as either obligating or authorizing a bank to accede to police
requests or to provide private papers to substantiate government suspicions concerning
depositors.
Note that a distinctly different "duty of cooperation" is occasionally mentioned in
American court opinions. This "duty of cooperation" generally refers to a bank's
obligation to expend a reasonable effort (of both time and expense) in furnishing
records needed in judicial proceedings or in attempting to comply with a court
subpoena. See United States v. Dauphin Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 1967);
Mc, fann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937); United
States v. Jones, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9197 (M.D. Ala., Oct. 6, 1972); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616, 625 (S.D. Ala. 1946). But see United
States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Minn. 1973) ("it would appear that a
bank [served with an IRS summons] has a duty to cooperate [through full com-
pliance?], even in the absence of a court order . . ."). This "duty of cooperation" is
often coupled with qualifications concerning the customer's rights. See, e.g., Cooley
v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930, 933 (D. Mass. 1928).
144. See generally p. 1442, notes 88 & 107 supra.
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Amendment protection by "advising" bankers to be wary of certain
depositors suggests that the public duty exception be interpreted
narrowly.
C. Voluntariness of Consent
The use of administrative summons to obtain bank records raises
doubts concerning the bank's voluntariness in giving consent. Many
bankers are unaware that an administrative summons carries no en-
forcement authority and may be resisted. 14 Their acquiescence to an
administrative search is thus often the result of apparent coercion.
Whether a banker's acquiescence is sufficiently "voluntary" so as to
render the search of bank records reasonable, however, lies on the
uncertain ground between two major Supreme Court cases. Bumper
v. North Carolina4 6 held that consent to search given by a home-
owner was invalid when police stated that they possessed a search
warrant and implied that they would search the premises in any case.
Evidence obtained in the search was excluded as fruits of an illegal
seizure. On the other hand, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte147 held that
the state, in demonstrating valid consent, need not prove the claim-
ant's knowledge of a right to refuse permission to search,148 and in
dicta indicated that consent might be valid even given total absence
of such knowledge. 149 Unless Schneckloth is read to imply that knowl-
edge of a right to refuse is irrelevant, it would appear that a depositor
who could prove that his banker did in fact reasonably believe that
he had no right to refuse the summons would succeed in invalidating
the search.
The validity and authority of the bank's consent may thus prove
nonexistent and therefore not relinquish the individual's Fourth
Amendment interest. However, consent is also an issue which bears
upon the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment through the exclu-
sionary rule. Even though a search is without effective consent (and,
absent a warrant, "unreasonable" according to an objective balancing
145. The President of the American Bankers Association, Rex Morthland, stated,
When [an administrative summons] had been issued and presented properly,
I don't know of any cases where it has been resisted. I hasten to add however,
that there is a lack of knowledge on the part of bankers that they can legally
resist such a [summons] .... I try to study these things a little more diligently
than most people, but it was only a few years ago that I knew I could resist
such an administrative summons.
Bank Disclosure Hearings, supra note 3, at 232.
146. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
147. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
148. Id. at 232, 234, 248-49.
149. Id. at 234.
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of police needs and privacy), evidence may nonetheless be admitted if
the actual police behavior was reasonable under the circumstances. 150
Notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the search, exclusion as a
means of deterrence would, in such a case, have no effect.15' This
consideration may weigh against retroactive evidentiary exclusion
where police justifiably believed that their actions were within the
limits of the law as then pronounced. Yet, once the depositor's Fourth
Amendment interest in bank records is known, exclusion as a deter-
rence measure would be justified.
V. Reconciling Fourth Amendment Interests With Police Needs
Recognition of depositors' Fourth Amendment interests in check-
ing account records will likely be resisted on grounds of law enforce-
ment needs. The Fourth Amendment implicitly recognizes these needs
by forbidding only unreasonable searches. It is here, in the assessment
of "unreasonable searches and seizures," that police claims must be
balanced against the protection given the individual's privacy. By
contrast, the initial determination of Fourth Amendment interests
depends only upon the strength of the privacy interest involved, i.e.,
the presence of "justified expectations of privacy," a factor in which
law enforcement requirements bear little relevance. Whether Fourth
Amendment interests exist is a question only of identifying the sub-
ject matter to be protected, not a matter of balancing the protection
given against the interests of police authority. 52 These two distinct
processes should not be confused. If reasonableness criteria such as
150. Examination of police behavior to determine whether Fourth Amendment
sanctions should be invoked is clearly seen in United States v. Roberts, 223 F. Supp.
49 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980
(1965). The court, however, mistakenly perceives its analysis as going to the validity
of consent and the objective reasonableness of the search rather than to the ex-
clusionary issue. Perhaps this is due to a judicial reluctance to admit that evidence
obtained in an "unreasonable" search is not necessarily excluded.
151. The inapplicability of the exclusionary rule despite the existence of an un-
reasonable search is best illustrated in a hypothetical example. Assume that while
B is burglarizing A's home, police come to the door. Having no choice other than
running and surely entailing chase, B decides to answer the door and act the part
of a resident. When B greets the police, he is informed that they are undertaking an
investigation of A and would like to search the premises. Representing himself as a
cotenant, B invites the police to search. Evidence incriminating A is discovered in
common areas of the house. Later, A is arrested and charged on the basis of this
evidence. Still later, B is captured and will testify to all the events. Despite the
invalidity of the consent and therefore the objective unreasonableness of the search
not conducted pursuant to a warrant, evidence may not be excluded since, under
the circumstances, the actual police behavior was reasonable; cf. Roberts v. United
States, 223 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 980 (1965).
152. See generally Note, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6
U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 154, 179-80 (1972).
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"probable cause"'15 3 or enforcement methods such as the exclusionary
rule' 54 are defective or unfair, these problems should forthrightly be
considered on their own terms and in their own sphere and not al-
lowed to distort the nature of Fourth Amendment interests.1
55
The Court in California Bankers Association v. Shultz never assessed
the reasonableness of government access to bank microfilms, and com-
mented only that access was "controlled by existing legal process."' 5 6
Absent the depositor's Fourth Amendment interest in bank records,
however, "legal process" may amount to nothing more than bank
acquiescence to government surveillance.
57
Only recognition of a Fourth Amendment interest in checking
account records endows "legal process" with substantive meaning out-
side the context of administrative subpoenas.' 58 Assuming that cur-
rent standards for determining the reasonableness of searches remain
unchanged, the Fourth Amendment should protect depositors against
examinations of bank records conducted without judicial supervision
or without the depositor's consent.' 59 The standards of reasonableness
153. The Supreme Court has insisted upon "probable cause as a minimum require-
ment for a reasonable search" and has declared searches without warrants "per se
unreasonable" unless they fall within "a carefully defined set of exceptions based on
the presence of 'exigent circumstances.'" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1969).
See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971); T. TAYLOR, Two
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24, 39-44 (1969).
154. For recent comment, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970).
155. Criteria for determining the existence of Fourth Amendment interests and
for "reasonable" searches have on occasion been mixed together. Recent opinions may
have embraced an expansive view of the Fourth Amendment's scope by erroneously
relying on the relative impropriety of the police behavior involved-factors that have
little to do with the privacy interest protected. See United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d
1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded per curiam, 409 U.S. 33 (1972),
aff'd on rehearing, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412
U.S. 919 (1973); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
A radical proposal for interpreting the Fourth Amendment, Judge Hufstedler's, would
abandon all limits upon Fourth Amendment interests and would consider all govern-
ment activities as searches of the individual's person. Extremely flexible criteria would
be used to evaluate the reasonableness of the search and seizure. See Hufstedler,
supra note 81, at 561-62. While courts to a limited extent adjust reasonableness
criteria to the subject of the search and seizure (see Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S.
496, 501-06 (1973)), Judge Hufstedler's infinite expansion of Fourth Amendment in-
terests is at this point only an academic, though intriguing, proposal.
156. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1513 (1974).
157. See id. at 1535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Where the government attempts to obtain bank records through judicial en-
forcement of an administrative summons, a court may permit a depositor to intervene
in proper circumstances to contest a wrongful use of the summons or raise objections
at a later trial. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
159. There are a few instances where the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe a
search of the depositor's accounts. Audits by bank examiners and other inspections
necessary for regulation of the banking industry are clearly permissible as "reason-
able," even if deemed "searches" of the depositor. The Supreme Court has approved
warrantless searches where necessary for the supervision of government regulated busi-
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applicable to a particular search vary with the type of access at-
tempted.10 A full-blown ex parte search and seizure would be con-
sidered unreasonable unless pursuant to a warrant or justified by
exigent circumstances; probable cause would of course be necessary.' 61
While the standard of probable cause need not be met when docu-
ments are compelled by administrative or grand jury subpoenas, judi-
cial supervision and other constitutional safeguards would still be
present.'0 2 Since banks lack authority to consent to a search or relin-
ness. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 271 (1973); Youghioheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.
Ohio 1973). The burdens of bank audits are clearly necessary for the maintenance
of a sound banking system, and in the terminology of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, supra, at 271, depositors must "accept the burdens as well as the benefits"
of the banking system. Use of the banking system implies a consent to searches
reasonably necessary for the system's maintenance. Also, information concerning the
depositor is not a focus of, and is generally extraneous to, the examiners' inquiry.
See also United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 n.2 (3d Cir.
1967); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala. 1946);
Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1928). Fourth Amendment interests-
which are dependent upon "justified expectations of privacy" generated by the bank's
role as a passive intermediary-would not prevent searches, or exclude their fruits,
when occasioned by the bank's status as the depositor's agent, e.g., investigations of
forged, altered, or stolen items or of embezzlement directly concerning the bank in
its relationship with the depositor.
160. The Bank Secrecy Act and the Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder
provide for an additional means of government access to bank information-required
reports of depositor transactions. See note 52 supra. These reporting requirements
are discussed in more detail in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494,
1505-07 (1974). There the reporting requirements were upheld as to the banks, without
reaching any possible claims the depositors might have under the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments as to the domestic reporting requirements. Id. at 1518-24. The Court
rejected depositors' Fourth Amendment objections to the foreign transaction reports.
Id. at 1516-18.
161. See note 153 supra.
162. Probable cause is not required for issuance and enforcement of an adminis-
trative subpoena. United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 973 (1969). Administrative subpoenas are generally upheld if: (1) the under-
lying investigation has a legitimate civil purpose and is authorized by Congress; (2) the
documents sought are relevant and material to the investigation; (3) the subpoena
is sufficiently specific so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome; (4) pro-
cedural requirements are met. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-11 (1946); FTC v. American Tobacco Co.,
264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924); United States v. DeGrosa, supra. See also Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1971) (subpoena may not be used in support of
an ongoing criminal prosecution); Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3584 (1974) (IRS subpoena for bank records held
unauthorized when no specific taxpayer has been identified as the subject of the
investigation); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973) (accord with
Bisceglia).
The requirement of a civil purpose for issuance of an administrative subpoena
has recently been criticized. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggerio, 300 F. Supp. 968 (C.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971) (in tax
investigations some civil purpose is always present; Fourth Amendment merely forbids
use of subpoenas for criminal prosecution in esse). See generally Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). Justice
Douglas's concurrence in Donaldson, which was quoted in California Bankers Ass'n
v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1513 (1974), implies that administrative subpoenas may be
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quish records, an administrative summons delivered to the bank
should not be permitted to undercut the depositor's rights.
1 3
Conclusion
Bank depositors' privacy can perhaps be guaranteed to some extent
through a number of ad hoc legal doctrines, including a property-
oriented Fourth Amendment. But a more important task suggested
by a desire to protect that privacy is to conceptualize Fourth Amend-
ment interests in terms more appropriate to a technological society
in which property and privacy are no longer unified. The Supreme
Court has already left behind the technicalities of property law and
has charted a broad construction of Fourth Amendment interests
based upon "expectations of privacy." This Note has maintained that
bank depositors' expectations of privacy with regard to their personal
checking account records are justified: Not only is a high degree of
individual informational control desirable; it is supported by cus-
tomary norms, practices, and legal constraints. If the safeguards en-
visioned by the Amendment's drafters are to remain viable, the Fourth
Amendment can demand no less than protection of these expectations
of privacy from the prying eye of the government.
utilized even to obtain evidence solely for criminal prosecutions. See Donaldson v. United
States, supra, at 537 (Douglas, J., concurring).
In the case of grand jury subpoenas probable cause is not required, but some
demonstration of reasonableness is necessary. In re September, 1971, Grand Jury, 454
F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub norn. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973);
In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973). The standards of reasonableness, however, remain unclear. September,
1971, Grand Jury called for an adversary hearing and adopted standards similar to
those applicable to administrative searches. 454 F.2d at 584-85. The Seventh Circuit
opinion in Dionisio noted that "the grand jury is not required to have a factual
basis for commencing an investigation and can pursue rumors and clues which further
investigation may prove groundless." 442 F.2d at 281. See also 410 U.S. at 15. The
Supreme Court reversed both decisions, holding that a subpoena of voice and hand-
writing exemplars was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 410 U.S. at 15, 22.
See also United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613, 618-19 (1974). See generally Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 91
(3d Cir. 1973).
163. See note 128 supra for a discussion of the differences between an adminis-
trative summons and a judicial subpoena. A bank would still have to respond to the
administrative summons, although its response may be merely to state that it has no
consensual authority to release the records.
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